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The end of the Cold War has brought about a decrease in global tensions
while regional disorder has increased. In particular, Southeast Asia has become
an area of economic and political instability. As a result, the possibility of an
increase in terrorism, separatist violence, ethnic disputes, and strained regional
relations takes on greater significance, both for United States foreign policy and
regional Southeast Asian relations. The main purpose of this thesis is to first,
examine political terrorism in Southeast Asia, with particular attention paid to
terrorism conducted by separatist groups in Thailand and Indonesia. Secondly,
this paper will discuss what actions are needed to contain political terrorism in
the region. Additionally, this paper will examine US Government anti-
terrorist/counter-terrorist policy and how it affects political terrorism in the region.
Finally, this thesis will demonstrate that there is a growing threat of terrorism in
Southeast Asia that can no longer be addressed unilaterally and that ASEAN can
use US policy and global initiatives as guidelines for greater cooperation. It is
therefore recommended that US policy towards terrorism need not change to
accommodate Southeast Asia and that ASEAN and its individual states take
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The end of the Cold War has brought about a decrease in global tensions
while regional disorder has increased. In particular, Southeast Asia has become
an area of economic and political instability. As a result, the possibility of an
increase in terrorism, separatist violence, ethnic disputes, and strained regional
relations takes on greater significance, both for United States foreign policy and
regional Southeast Asian relations.
While much attention has focused recently on international terrorism, there
has been little discussion about whether or not terrorism actually threatens vital
US interests. Although political terrorism in Southeast Asia is not new, the fear
that a rise in terrorism could lead to further instability in the region requires
increased attention on this matter.
The main purpose of this thesis is to first, examine political terrorism in
Southeast Asia, with particular attention paid to terrorism conducted by separatist
groups in Thailand and Indonesia. Secondly, this paper will discuss what actions
are needed to contain political terrorism in the region. Additionally, this paper will
examine US Government anti-terrorist/counter-terrorist policy and how it affects
political terrorism in the region. Finally, this thesis will demonstrate that there is a
growing threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia that can no longer be addressed
unilaterally and that ASEAN can use US policy and globaj initiatives as
guidelines for greater cooperation. It is therefore recommended that US policy
towards terrorism need not change to accommodate Southeast Asia and that
XI
ASEAN and its individual states take greater steps toward containing the spread
of terrorism in the region.
To address concerns about the spread of terrorism and to enhance
regional cooperation designed to fight terrorism, the inevitable questions of
definitions, standards, and style of language must be addressed. In defining the
concept of terrorism it is critical to isolate terrorism from specific political goals.
We need to recognize that not all nationalists, revolutionaries, or far-right
extremists are terrorists, and that no particular ideology or religion is responsible
for terrorism. Terrorist behavior must be distinguished from its causes in order to
control it. This distinction has been necessary to formulate international law and
foreign policy.
From independence until the 1990s, the issues and challenges that
preoccupied the nations of Southeast Asia were fairly well defined in Cold War
terms. These countries were either part of the group of states seeking to change
the world through revolution or part of the other group of states attempting to
contain revolutionary change. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution
of the Soviet Union, these old divides and structures are no longer relevant. The
challenge for Southeast Asia is to identify new ways to enhance regional stability
and global economic cooperation.
This thesis uses two case studies of political terrorism carried out by
separatist movements in Thailand and Indonesia. These two cases are
significant because a possible rise in political terrorism, as a result of the current
economic turmoil and moves toward political reform, could further destabilize the
XII
region and slow its recovery. Terrorism in this region is also significant because
of the growing integration of US and Southeast Asian economies. This thesis will
attempt to outline successful approaches to reduce the likelihood of terrorism
through domestic, regional, and international/US policy initiatives.
The case studies of Thailand and Indonesia demonstrate the necessity of
a strong unilateral approach toward counter-terrorism. However, the weakness
of such an approach is highlighted by its failure to extinguish the existence of
terrorism, especially political terrorism carried out by separatist organizations.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states must
individually and collectively develop workable bilateral and multilateral
conventions designed to isolate terrorist organizations from outside support. By
doing this ASEAN and its members can increase political stability within the
region.
It is therefore the recommendation of this thesis that US policy towards
terrorism need not change to accommodate Southeast Asia and that ASEAN and
its individual states take greater steps toward containing the spread of terrorism




/ regret that I have come to the conclusion that there is going to be
tremendous growth in international terrorism over the next decade
or so, not only directed against Americans but throughout the
world*
John Deutch, former CIA Director
As the economic gap widens between US prosperity and the Asian gloom,
rapidly changing political, economic, and social conditions may lead to an
increase in political terrorism directed at the governments and citizens of
Southeast Asia and possibly the United States.
With the end of the Cold War global tensions have decreased while
regional disorder has been on the increase. Today, Southeast Asia, in contrast
to its meteoric economic rise during the 1 980s and much of the 1 990s, has
become an area of regional economic and political instability. As a result of this
instability, the possibility of an increase in terrorism, separatist violence, age-old
ethnic disputes, and strained regional relations takes on greater significance,
both in the United States as well as in Southeast Asia.
Although much attention has focused recently on international terrorism,
there has been little discussion on whether or not terrorism in other countries
actually threatens vital US interests. This is rather surprising, given the proactive
nature of US counter-terrorist policy and the recent use of preemptive and
1 Quote from former CIA Director John Deutch, told to the House Intelligence Committee. "US
faces new wave of terrorism, CIA says," The Detroit News, 20 December 1995. Available
[Online]: <http://www.detnews.com/menu/stories/29297.htm> [9 September 1998].
retaliatory strikes. Although political terrorism in Southeast Asia is not new, the
fear that a rise in terrorism could lead to further instability in the region requires
increased attention on this matter.
A. PURPOSE
One purpose of this thesis is to examine political terrorism in Southeast
Asia during and after the Cold War, with particular attention paid to terrorism
conducted by separatist groups in Thailand and Indonesia. Second, this paper
will discuss what actions are needed to contain political terrorism in the region.
Third, this paper will examine US Government anti-terrorist/counter-terrorist
policy and how it affects political terrorism in the region. Finally, this thesis will
demonstrate that there is a growing threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia that can
no longer be addressed unilaterally. Additionally, this thesis provides some
suggestions on how US policy and global initiatives can be used as guidelines for
greater cooperation within ASEAN.
The ability of terrorists to launch high profile attacks has led some to view
terrorism as a threat of the highest proportion in the post Cold War era.
However, the remarks made following the terrorist attack at the Munich Olympic
Games presents some of the same arguments that can be heard today:
Can anything be done to curb international terrorism, or must we accept that it
will simply continue to grow - and if so, where can we expect it to end? ... The
flare-up of international violence on the scale we are witnessing today is far more
dangerous than anything that has gone before: because thanks to modem
technology sophisticated weapons in the hands of both governments and
protesting groups pose a much grater threat to international law and peace. ...
No air traveler is secure from attacks by politically motivated, or paranoiac, or
simply criminal individuals; no letter can be opened in safety; diplomats can no
longer go about their business without fear of being kidnapped or of losing their
lives; nobody can be sure he is not a potential hostage; no international gathering
.. is free from threats of violence.
2
B. DEFINING TERRORISM
To address these concerns and to enhance regional cooperation, the
inevitable questions of definitions, standards, and style of language must be
addressed. States must be consistent in their use of the term "terrorist." Many
governments use this word indiscriminately to describe many phenomena
(guerrilla warfare, civil violence, and ordinary crimes). There is also hesitation to
clearly label a terrorist act as such if one's friends commit it. If this is the case,
states that responded with silence on selected cases of terrorism should expect
no better from those they criticize regarding other acts of terrorism.3
The difficulty in defining terrorism, aside from its variation across of numerous
nationalities and cultures, is that terrorist acts may be perpetrated for numerous
reasons. First, individual acts of terrorism may be designed to extract specific
concessions, such as the payment of ransom or release of prisoners. Second,
terrorism may also be an attempt by an organization to gain publicity. Third,
terrorism's goal might involve the spreading of disorder, the demoralization of
society, or the breaking down of social order. Fourth, terrorism might try to
induce the government into repression, hoping that the government would then
self-destruct. Fifth, terrorism can be used as a tool to enforce obedience and
cooperation. Finally, terrorism is often meant to be a form of punishment.
2
Colin Legum, "What is Terrorism?" London Observer, 26 November 1972 (reprinted in Current,
January 1973, 3-9), in Jeffery D. Simon, Misperceiving the Terrorist Threat (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 1987), 5-6.
Indeed, terrorists often declare that their victims are somehow guilty or
responsible for the attack against them. 4
Any single definition of terrorism is far from universal. However, in order
to combat terrorism it is first necessary to define it. In doing so, thesis takes as
its starting point the definition used by the Department of State since 1983:
• The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents usually
intended to influence an audience.
• The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving
citizens or the territory of more than one country.
• The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or
that has significant subgroups that practice, international
terrorism.
5
Incidents of international terrorism have declined since 1987 (see Figure
1 ). However, the number of incidents and related casualties (see Figures 2 and
3) have fluctuated widely. It can be argued that aside from large peaks in
casualties from year to year, international terrorism remains a constant and
dangerous problem.
3
Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 200.
4
William Regis Farrell, The US Government Response to Terrorism: In Search of an Effective
Strategy (Boulder: Westview, 1982), 10. For a discussion on the difficulty defining terrorism
within the US government see David Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United
States and International Terrorism (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997) 51-69.
5
According to Title 22, United States Code 2656f(d). This information can be found in the
Department of State's Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997. It is also noted that for the purposes of
this definition, the term "noncombatant" is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military
personal who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty. Department of State.
"Introduction," Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997. Available [Online]:
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1997ReporV1997index.html> [24 August 1998].
4
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Source: Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997. Available
[Online]: <http://wvvw.state.gov/www/global/terrorisnV1997Report/incidents.html>
[24 August 1998].
Figure 1: International Terrorist Incidents, 1978-97






Source: Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997. Available [Online]:
<http:/Aftww.state.govAwww/global/terrorisrn/1997Report/region.html> [24 August 1998].
Figure 2: International Incidents by Region, 1992-97
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Source: Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997. Available
[Online]: <http://www.state.g0v/www/gl0bal/terr0rism/l 997Report/casualties html>
[24 August 1998].
Figure 3: Casualties of International Terrorism Incidents, 1992-97
To many, "terrorism" has become a political label, used to condemn an
enemy rather than to specify what terrorism is and what it is not. It is important to
note that terrorism is not exactly the same as violence. Terrorism aims by the
use of violence or the threat of violence to coerce governments, authorities, or
populations by inducing fear.6 As a result, the political nature of terrorism is
irreversibly linked to questions of legitimacy in international as well as domestic
politics.
7
In defining the concept of terrorism, it is critical to isolate terrorism from
specific political goals. First, it must be acknowledged that not all nationalists,
revolutionaries, or far-right extremists are terrorists. Additionally, no particular
ideology or religion is responsible for terrorism. Terrorism, as a means, is
logically separable from the ends it purportedly serves. Terrorist behavior must
be distinguished from its causes in order to control it. This has been necessary
to formulate international law on the subject, which has focused on the
component parts of terrorism, such as hijackings or diplomatic kidnappings, in
order to treat them as crimes.8
C. POLITICAL TERRORISM
While it is important to understand the nature and danger of international
terrorism, it is the purpose of this thesis to examine the political terrorism within
Southeast Asia. Political terrorism differs significantly from international
terrorism. According to Peter Chalk, political terrorism is the "systematic use of
6
Richard Clutterbuck, Guerrillas and Terrorists (London: Farber, 1977), 21.
7




illegitimate violence that is employed by substate actors as a means to achieve
specific political objectives - these objectives differing according to the group
concerned. It is a psychological tactic that seeks to [induce fear] in a ... group
wider than the immediate audience through the actual or feared indiscriminate
targeting of civilians and other noncombatants."9
The strategy of political terrorism can be defined as a method in which an
organized group or party tries to get attention for its aims or force concessions in
favor of its goals through the systematic use of deliberate violence. Politics and
terrorism share a number of similarities. Both have developed in response to
changes in the international environment. "The purpose of each is to persuade
and prevail, and both rely heavily on symbolism." 10 However, the overriding
difference is the terrorists' use of violence. To distinguish domestic political
terrorism from international terrorism, this thesis limits its scope to actions that
take place within the geographical boundaries of a single state, carried out by its
citizens, in an attempt to influence that state's behavior. 11
Political terrorism is most prevalent and dangerous during periods of armed
separatism. 12 Ultimately, separatist causes arise in cases where power has
9
Peter Chalk, Western European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic
(London: MacMillan, 1996), 22.
10
J. E. Karkashian, Too Many Things Not Working," in Diplomats and Terrorists: What Works,
What Doesnt A Symposium, ed. M.F. Herz (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University, 1982), 6;
quoted in Andrew Selth, Against Every Human Law: The Terrorist Threat to Diplomacy
(Rushcutters Bay: Australian National University Press, 1988), 3.
11
Farrell, 13.
12 Armed separatism can be described as the process whereby an ethnic group, or a coalition of
ethnic groups, seeks to secede or gain autonomy from the control, de facto and dejure, of a
given state, through an organized and purposeful use of force, alone or in combination with other
means. Such use of force constitutes acts of revolutionary violence in that it expresses a
rejection of the prevailing political and social system and a determination to bring about
To many, "terrorism" has become a political label, used to condemn an
enemy rather than to specify what terrorism is and what it is not. It is important to
note that terrorism is not exactly the same as violence. Terrorism aims by the
use of violence or the threat of violence to coerce governments, authorities, or
populations by inducing fear.6 As a result, the political nature of terrorism is
irreversibly linked to questions of legitimacy in international as well as domestic
politics.
7
In defining the concept of terrorism, it is critical to isolate terrorism from
specific political goals. First, it must be acknowledged that not all nationalists,
revolutionaries, or far-right extremists are terrorists. Additionally, no particular
ideology or religion is responsible for terrorism. Terrorism, as a means, is
logically separable from the ends it purportedly serves. Terrorist behavior must
be distinguished from its causes in order to control it. This has been necessary
to formulate international law on the subject, which has focused on the
component parts of terrorism, such as hijackings or diplomatic kidnappings, in
order to treat them as crimes. 8
C. POLITICAL TERRORISM
While it is important to understand the nature and danger of international
terrorism, it is the purpose of this thesis to examine the political terrorism within
Southeast Asia. Political terrorism differs significantly from international
terrorism. According to Peter Chalk, political terrorism is the "systematic use of
6
Richard Clutterbuck, Guerrillas and Terrorists (London: Farber, 1977), 21.
7




illegitimate violence that is employed by substate actors as a means to achieve
specific political objectives - these objectives differing according to the group
concerned. It is a psychological tactic that seeks to [induce fear] in a ... group
wider than the immediate audience through the actual or feared indiscriminate
targeting of civilians and other noncombatants."9
The strategy of political terrorism can be defined as a method in which an
organized group or party tries to get attention for its aims or force concessions in
favor of its goals through the systematic use of deliberate violence. Politics and
terrorism share a number of similarities. Both have developed in response to
changes in the international environment. "The purpose of each is to persuade
and prevail, and both rely heavily on symbolism." 10 However, the overriding
difference is the terrorists' use of violence. To distinguish domestic political
terrorism from international terrorism, this thesis limits its scope to actions that
take place within the geographical boundaries of a single state, carried out by its
citizens, in an attempt to influence that state's behavior. 11
Political terrorism is most prevalent and dangerous during periods of armed
separatism. 12 Ultimately, separatist causes arise in cases where power has
9
Peter Chalk, Western European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic
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Farrell, 13.
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changed hands or where international agreement, historically determined by the
colonial power of the time, consolidated a number of distinct regional or national
entities into single nations. A prominent example of this is the Palestinians
whose national refugee status and discontent gave rise directly to the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) and its terrorism. 13
Historically, nationalist-separatist groups using political terrorism have
demonstrated considerably greater durability in recent decades than all other
kinds of political terrorists. In contrast, ideologically oriented, non-separatist
groups, such as the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Italian Red Brigades, some Latin
American groups, even the Turkish terrorist movements which were so strong
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, have come and gone whereas those
expressing nationalist aims have been able to stay alive. 14
Some nationalist-separatist groups have been more enduring because: a) their
ethnic-religious appeal guaranteed them wider popular support than did the
ideological appeals of other groups, or b) because they received massive support
from a foreign power, or c) because the government of their country was in an
advanced state of decay, no longer capable of mobilizing the vastly superior
resources of the state against terrorists. These causes continue to be a
"progressive" changes by overthrowing this system. Ethnic groups can be defined as
"collectivities of individuals who feel a sense of belonging based on cultural traits - usually some
combinations of religion, language, and social mores - and a notion of common ancestry. The
boundaries that separate 'we' and they' are not necessarily territorial. They consist of perceived
bonds of shared loyalties and perceived differences from outsiders." M.R. Sukhumbhand
Paribatra and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, "Factors Behind Armed Separatism: A Framework for
Analysis," in Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia, eds. Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1983) 34.
13 Stephen Segaller, Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1987), 32.
10
nuisance. However, many of these groups have been unable to achieve the
ultimate goal of an independent nation-state. Terrorism continues, partly
because it has existed on a small scale throughout history, but mainly because
foreign support (state sponsored international terrorism) has prolonged the life
span of terrorism which otherwise might well have been much shorter. 15 The
political gains of the PLO in recent years demonstrate the greater utility of
nonviolent confrontation and negotiation versus the threat or use of political
terrorism.
Nationalist groups will continue to struggle to achieve a redistribution of
wealth and power and the settlement of claims for ethnic, religious and social
rights. Whatever form terrorism takes it will continue and will most likely expand
to take advantage of new vulnerabilities within modern society. 16
This thesis uses two case studies of political terrorism carried out by
separatist movements in Thailand and Indonesia. These two cases are
significant because a possible rise in political terrorism, as a result of the current
economic turmoil and moves toward political reform, could further destabilize the
region and slow its recovery. Terrorism in this region is also significant because
of the growing integration of US and Southeast Asian economies. This thesis will
attempt to outline successful approaches to reduce the likelihood of terrorism
through domestic, regional, and international/US policy initiatives.
14




Gary R. Perlstein, "Defining International Terrorism," Jane's Defence Weekly Vol 12, No. 24
(16 December 1989): 1339.
11
Chapter II provides an overview of the reasons for terrorism, the people
who commit terrorism, and the typical operations carried out by terrorists.
Chapter III presents a broad overview of the state of terrorism in Southeast Asia
in the 1990s and sets the stage for the case studies of Thailand and Indonesia
presented in Chapter IV. The case studies will examine the respective
approaches taken by Thailand and Indonesia at addressing the factors that have
led to political terrorism in their countries. Chapter V assesses US and regional
policy aimed at curbing the spread of political terrorism in Southeast Asia.
Chapter VI concludes with a summary of counter-terrorist policy and its
implications, and recommendations for Southeast Asia's future security.
12
II. BACKGROUND
A. REASONS FOR TERRORISM
As David Rapoport points out, "terrorism's prime purpose, whether
motivated by political, religious, social, economic or racial conflict, is to create
public recognition for its creator and his or her claims and causes. Given the
nature of a terrorist act - random selection of targets, unique means of delivering
violence, unpredictability - its intended results will create immediate and
immense shock with a population. Perpetrators then hope that the shock will
develop into public hysteria." 17 The population perceives the target government
to be ineffective, negligent or, at the very least, unacceptable because it is
unable to protect them from the terrorists, or because the terrorists are seen as
the solution and not the problem.
Scholars and experts disagree as to whether the terrorism that plagues
the world community results from the extraterritorial spillover of local grievances
or whether it is a deliberate attack on international order. The effects of terrorism
on international security may be incidental to its intended impact on the local
distribution of power. 18 What is clear and definable is that a terrorist is not a
"freedom fighter." When the terrorist's stated aim is the overthrow of a
government by direct violence, then the violence represents revolution. If the
violence, however, is aimed at civilians and civilian property - an airport ticket
17
David Rapoport, "The Politics of Atrocity," Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York:
John Jay College Press, 1977), quoted in Richard Allan, Terrorism: Pragmatic International
Deterrence and Cooperation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 2.
13
counter, a school bus filled with children, a tourist bus, an airplane filled with
civilians -then the violence constitutes terrorism. 19
Terrorism does not necessarily reflect mass discontent or deep social
divisions. More likely it represents the disaffection of a fragment of the elite who
take it upon themselves to act on the behalf of a majority unaware of its plight,
unwilling to take action to remedy its grievances, or unable to express dissent. 20
Terrorism is an attractive strategy for small organizations that want to attract
attention, provoke the government, intimidate opponents, appeal for sympathy,
impress an audience, or maintain the adherence of the faithful. The ease,
simplicity, and rapidity of terrorism strengthens its appeal.
B. THE TYPICAL TERRORIST
According to research conducted by Martha Crenshaw, most terrorists are
young. This may account for their willingness to take risks and their ability to
overcome the moral inhibitions that would prevent most people from using
extreme violence in a way that defies social norms. It has also been suggested
that terrorists are people whose identity formation is incomplete. Their
immaturity makes them susceptible to extremist beliefs and to the power of the
group and its leaders. Research has also indicated that the terrorist may be
ashamed about violence, uncomfortable with his or her own aggressive
tendencies and likely to blame others rather than to accept responsibility for





justice of their cause to the point that they are able to distance themselves from
their victims. Their self-righteousness is absolute. Most terrorists conceive of
their actions as defensive and justified. They often imagine themselves as
sacrificial victims or as avengers. Their self-conceptions are displayed in their
use of an elaborate military and legalistic terminology, a parody of the state. 21
Typical terrorists are individuals trained and disciplined to carry out the
violence decided upon by their organizations. If caught, true terrorists can be
expected to speak and act during their trials not primarily to win personal
freedom, but to try to spread their organization's political ideas.22
C. TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
Terrorist organizations carry out actions in a purposeful manner, not in a
spontaneous reaction to circumstances. Because of this, terrorism usually
occurs in times of peace rather than war, and often comes as a surprise to its
victims. Terrorist organizations are more likely to choose targets that bear no
directly offensive intentions toward themselves - airline passengers, journalist,
diplomats, educators, business executives and other civilians. This tactic is in
contrast to traditional reliance on assassinations of prominent officials (who are
typically well protected). Terrorists prefer easy targets.23
For terrorist organizations intelligence and secrecy are an essential
prerequisite for a successful operation. Generations, therefore, routinely study
Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," in International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes,
Controls, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 124.
21 Crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation, 18.
22
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23 Crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation, 6.
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the lessons learned from mistakes made by former comrades who have been
killed or apprehended. Press accounts, judicial indictments, courtroom
testimony, and trial transcripts are examined for information on security force
tactics and methods and are absorbed by surviving group members. 24 Not only
are successor generations often smarter than their predecessors, but they also
tend to be more sophisticated, more ruthless, and less idealistic.25
The people within a terrorist organization perform a number of different
roles. These tasks can be highly specialized, especially in large and complex
organizations. The person who makes a bomb, for example, or buys a gun, is
unlikely to be the person who uses it. Most importantly, the leaders who make
decisions do not implement them. 26
D. TERRORIST OPERATIONS
Terrorists continue to rely on two basic weapons: the gun and the bomb.
The ability to explode bombs of sufficient force to kill hundreds of people appears
to coincide with a lessening of moral inhibitions about the use of violence. This
erosion of inhibitions may be due in part to the actions of a state whose brutality
against its own citizens is seen as state terrorism.27
In all probability, any changes in terrorist tactics will be evolutionary rather
than planned, and will represent the culmination of a series of incremental
changes. It seems likely that terrorism will be a more serious problem in the near
24








future for two reasons. First, the incremental changes in the nature of terrorism
and terrorist organizations will eventually lead some group to attempt to use
weapons of mass destruction. Second, the way in which political socialization
has occurred worldwide, over the past few decades, suggests that terrorism may
come to be seen by a wider range of groups as an acceptable way to stop
governments from operating in ways counter to their interests. The combination
of radical political activism and easier access to powerful weapons brings greater
dangers to more people.28
Aside from choice of weapons, terrorist operations are distinguished by
secrecy and surprise. Characteristically, the victims of terrorism are not the
targets (see Figure 4). That they are terrorized is important only in so far as their
terror is communicated to a watching audience, whose emotions the terrorists
seek to manipulate. Because of this, terrorism is often referred to as the weapon
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Source: Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997.
Available [Online]:
<http://www.state.gOv/www/global/terrorism/1 997Report/facility.html> [24 August
1998].
Figure 4: International Incidents by Type of Facility, 1992-97
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Figure 5: Map of Southeast Asia
There are indications that the threat of terrorism is spreading in Southeast
Asia despite being "traditionally" seen as a symptom indicative of Middle Eastern,
Western European and Latin American problems. In the past, countries in
Southeast Asia have dealt with threats to internal stability on their own or from
assistance from former colonial rulers. Terrorism, in the post-Cold War era, has
brought the threat of further instability to countries in Southeast Asia that no
longer enjoy the benefits of rapid economic growth and long-standing political
arrangements. Nowhere is this more evident than in Indonesia. If the "Asian
economic flu" is any indication of how terrorism can spread throughout this
region, Southeast Asia can not afford to combat terrorism without aid from one
another. This chapter provides background for the case studies of Thailand and
Indonesia.
19
A. FACTORS INFLUENCING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Political terrorism is not new to Southeast Asia. Today, the reasons for
political violence in the region can be linked to ethnic unrest, religious disputes,
political deprivation, and economic frustration. However, it can be argued that
most of post-colonial Southeast Asia's problems date back to the time when
arbitrary borders were drawn up purely to satisfy the desires of Western
colonizers. As a result, the governments of Southeast Asia are faced with the
tasks of trying to contain significant sectors of population that do not identify
strongly either with their national rulers or territorial boundaries. This
phenomenon is evident in Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Burma. 30
From independence until the 1990s, the issues and challenges that
preoccupied the nations of Southeast Asia were fairly well defined in Cold War
terms. These countries were either part of the group of states seeking to change
the world through revolution or part of the group of states attempting to contain
revolutionary change. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, these old divides and structures are no longer relevant. The
challenge for Southeast Asia now is to identify new ways to enhance regional
stability and global economic cooperation.
Throughout history cultural and ethnic assimilation has taken place
throughout the region. The idea that there would be resistance - even armed
resistance in some cases - to demands made by the ethnic majority or colonial
masters should not come as a surprise. But in many instances it is not clear why
30
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some national, ethnic or religious minorities took up arms and others did not. 31
Certainly terrorist incidents occur more widely in democratic, free societies. This
is partly because of opportunity of action and partly because of the potential
advantage of publicity. While terrorism does occur in the more controlled
societies (and the very nature of such societies means that we may hear far less
about their terrorism than might be justified by actual events), the control of
citizens' movements, work, political activities, and media, limits both opportunity
and potential payoff. 32
There are increasing indications that the threat of terrorism is spreading to
Southeast Asia. The greatest potential for future terrorist threats lies
predominantly in Burma and Indonesia. In Burma, cease-fires between
indigenous ethnic groups and the ruling military junta are tenuous at best. In
Indonesia, the country's current financial crisis may spark a general outbreak of
political violence as the public reacts to higher food prices, lower wages, job
losses, and the forced devaluation of savings. The potential political fall-out from
this economic crisis should not be underestimated. Perhaps the discovery of a
fake explosive package at the Sumatran airport of Polonia in February 1998 is
just a glimpse of future troubles. Attached to the device was a note warning the
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Another factor that may play a prominent role in the rise of political
terrorism in Southeast Asia may likely be the increase in population. Unlike the
United States, Japan, and the European Union, whose populations are aging due
to low birth rates and increased longevity, Southeast Asia's youth population is
growing. In Southeast Asia the employed members of the community will have to
carry the burden of providing food, shelter, clothing, education, and healthcare of
higher quality to this growing number of children and adolescents. In contrast,
industrial democracies benefit from developed welfare systems. As a RAND
analysis states, "The political implications of large numbers of alienated youth are
very serious."
34
Indeed, as was pointed out earlier, the youth usually carry the
sword of terrorism.
Although none of the terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia have
practiced terrorism on the scale of Western European and Middle Eastern
groups, many have been prepared to use limited terrorist tactics as part of their
overall political operations, primarily for four reasons. First, terrorism is an
inexpensive method of warfare that can achieve relatively effective results.
Second, through the psychology of fear, terrorism can artificially inflate the
perceived strength and power of the group. Third, by attracting maximum
publicity, terrorism can bring a cause to national, regional, or even global
attention. Finally, terrorist acts involve relatively little personal risk.35
34 Guy J. Pauker, Policy Implications of Political Institutionalization and Leadership Changes in
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B. COLD WAR TERRORISM
During the Cold War two main types of groups practiced terrorism in
Southeast Asia: communist organizations and armed separatist movements
involving indigenous ethnic or religious minorities. Communist organizations
began to take on greater significance as part of the wider ideological struggle that
was taking place between the East and West during the Cold War era. However,
the rise of these organizations were directly the result of anti-colonial movements
before and after the Second World War. Principal examples included the New
People's Army (NPA) in the Philippines, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB),
the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), the Khmer Rouge (KR) and the
Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM). The most overly terrorist in nature were
the CPM and NPA.
The Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) conducted terrorist activities
in Malaya on behalf of the CPM. Formed in 1948, the MRLA was led by Chin
Peng (Secretary General of the CPM) and was composed mostly of ethnic
Chinese. Its prime objective was to oust the British from Malaya and was most
active during the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960. The MRLA finally
conceded defeat in July 1960 when the state of emergency was officially
declared over. Throughout the insurgency the MRLA targeted plantations,
colonial facilities, the police and military, and ethnic Chinese-Malays who did not
support the CPM. Although the MRLA's campaign of terror failed, it cost well
over 1 1 ,000 lives as well as millions of dollars in much needed funds for social
and economic development.
23
The New People's Army (NPA) conducted terrorist activities in the
Philippines. The NPA was founded in 1968 and led by Bernabe Buscayno,
otherwise known as Commander Dante. Its main objective was revolution. One
of its primary goals was to coerce the Philippine and US Governments into
terminating the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA). In pursuit of this
objective, the NPA carried out numerous acts of terrorism, inflicting considerable
casualties in its primary areas of operation in and around Luzon, Mindanao, and
Negros. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the NPA received considerable
financial and logistical support from Libya as part of Qaddafi's program to
establish a string of revolutionary movements in the Asia Pacific region. The
NPA also received support from North Korea in return for providing information
on US-leased Clark Air Force Base and Subic Naval Base, as well as on key
American military figures.36
Armed separatist movements involving indigenous ethnic or religious
minorities arose in reaction to the unwillingness of Southeast Asian governments
to acknowledge the right of post-colonial self-determination. Throughout the
Cold War, several groups engaged in armed campaigns and periodic instances
of terrorism against state structures that they neither identified with nor perceived
as illegitimate. Examples included Fretelin (East Timor, Indonesia), the
Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM - Irian Jaya, Indonesia), the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF - Mindanao, the Philippines), the Pattani United
36
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Liberation Organization (PULO - Thailand), and a variety of ethnic groups in
Burma.
37
C. POST COLD WAR TERRORISM
The end of the Cold War has had both positive and negative effects in
Southeast Asia with regard to internal insurgency and associated terrorist unrest.
On the positive side, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc has
contributed to the rapid decline of Communism as a revolutionary political force. 38
However, as Figure 6 points out, the region is far from incident free.








Source: Peter Chalk, Grey-Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: Piracy, Drug Trafficking and
Political Terrorism (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1997), 59. Original data
from Pinkerton's Risk Assessment Services, Annual Risk Database 1990-1996 (Pinkerton's Inc.,
1991-1997).
Figure 6: Terrorism Incidents in Selected Southeast Asian Countries, 1990-96
Throughout East Asja, terrorism increased in 1997. In October 1997, the
US Secretary of State designated the Khmer Rouge as a foreign terrorist
organization pursuant to the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996. In the Philippines, the implementation of a peace agreement with
insurgent groups has reduced fighting, but former members of these insurgent
groups and members of Philippine terrorist organizations have continued attacks






continued separatist violence, not targeted against foreigners but having the
potential to claim foreigners as collateral victims. 39
Burma: The explosion in April of a parcel bomb at the house of a senior
official of Burma's military-led government was the most significant terrorist event
in Burma in 1997. The blast killed the adult daughter of Lieutenant-General Tin
Oo, Secretary Number Two of the ruling State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC). No group or individual claimed responsibility for the attack,
but the Government of Burma attributes the act to Burmese antigovernment
activists in Japan; the package bore Japanese stamps and postmarks. The
Burmese expatriate and student community in Japan denied any involvement in
the incident.40
Cambodia: Continued defections from the Khmer Rouge to the
government and the split of the group into pro- and anti-Pol Pot factions have
greatly reduced the threat it poses to the Phnom Penh government.
Nevertheless, the hard-liners based in the Khmer Rouge stronghold at Anlong
Veng regularly launch guerrilla-style attacks on government troops in several
provinces. Guerrillas are also suspected in two deadly attacks against ethnic
Vietnamese civilians in Cambodia, but they have denied playing a role in the
disappearance of two Filipino and two Malaysian employees of a logging
company in December 1997. The most significant terrorist incident in Cambodia
in 1997 was the grenade attack on an opposition political rally on 30 March 1997.
Nineteen persons were killed in the attack, and more than 100 were injured,
*1Q
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including one US citizen. Those responsible for the attack have not yet been
apprehended.41
Furthermore, political violence stemming from a general breakdown in law
and order remains a serious problem. Although weakened, the KR remains one
of the main threats to internal security. The organization refused to accept the
legitimacy of the CPP (Cambodian People's Party)-Funcinpec coalition
government which was formed after UN supervised elections in May 1993. As
an active guerrilla group, the KR is now weaker than it has been for many years,
but still capable of terrorist violence. The absence of a strong unified central
government suggests that there is little chance that the KR's historical shadow of
political violence will be eliminated from the Cambodian landscape.42
Recently the Moneakseka Khmer political party announced that a team
numbering some 50 people returned to Cambodia after three years of terrorist
training acquired in Vietnam. The Moneakseka Khmer stated that its aim is to
foment terrorism against journalists who oppose its policy and the politicians
whom this party considers to be its enemies.43
The Philippines: Despite being weakened by factionalism and the collapse
of communism in Europe, the Philippine communist movement appears to be
regaining some lost ground. According to the military, there were about 6,700
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National Liberation Front now in the government's fold, the military is left to deal
with the extremist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf
Group. Both groups operate in Mindanao. The MILF, with a strength of 10,700
with around 8,000 firearms, is considered by the military to be a serious threat to
security in Mindanao. The Abu Sayyaf, numbering fewer than 1 ,000 men, is also
a source of concern, because it is feared that it could step up its terrorist and
criminal activities to raise more funds. Additionally, the military fears the country
"could be used as staging ground for the conduct of terrorism elsewhere."44
In 1996, the Philippine Government began implementing the terms of a
peace agreement signed with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and
continued efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF). The government's anti-Communist operations in 1997
had mixed results. In late 1997, following an upsurge in small-scale attacks by
the NPA on police and government units, negotiations were suspended with the
political arm of the communist New People's Army (NPA). The government
pledged to revisit the issue of a dialogue with the communists if acceptable
arrangements for a cease-fire could be met. Another communist rebel group, the
Alex Bonacayao Brigade, is not participating in peace talks with the government.
Further complicating the situation in the southern Philippines is the fact
that extremist Christians are actively opposed to giving Muslims any autonomy at
all. Four Christian vigilante groups have proclaimed their intention to engage in
acts of political violence and terrorism if any moves are made to create a
44
"Philippine Communists Appear to be Making a Comeback," The Straits Times (Singapore), 23
August 1997.
28
permanent autonomous Muslim area in the southern Philippines. One group, the
Military Christian Unified Command (MCUC) has reportedly stated that it intends
to launch attacks if any attempt is made to disarm the Christian community in
Mindanao.45
In September 1997 a previously unknown group calling itself the Filipino
Soldiers for the Nation claimed responsibility for grenade attacks at bus terminals
in Manila and Bulacan City that killed six persons and wounded 65. Press
reports indicated the group demanded a constitutionally prohibited second term
for President Ramos. However, the Ramos government strongly condemned the
attacks and blamed them on unknown agitators.46
An October 1997 attack on a Philippine army base on Mindanao by two
foreign terrorists has rekindled concerns over the country's vulnerability to
terrorism. The two attackers may have been part of a terrorist team that slipped
into the country in late 1994 together with convicted terrorist Ramzi Ahmed
Yousef, who allegedly plotted to kill Pope John Paul II and to bomb US airlines 47
Vietnam: Relatively little is known or written about political terrorism within
Vietnam. However, a Vietnamese court recently sentenced two persons to death
and three others to life in prison for carrying out a grenade attack on the
waterfront in Ho Chi Minh City in 1994, in which twenty persons, including ten
45
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foreigners, were injured. The five were part of the Vietnam Front for Regime
Restoration, an antigovemment exile group based in the United States. 48
Southeast Asia: Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of terrorism in
Southeast Asia is that it may be linked to international Islamic extremism. The
Philippine terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, has created local logistical infrastructures
for transnational Islamic organizations in exchange for arms and financing. The
infrastructure includes safe houses, rest and recovery services, training areas,
arms caches, money laundering, and possible recruitment opportunities.
Concrete evidence of an international connection between Muslim extremists in
the Philippines and other Islamic organizations first began to emerge in January
1 995. The successful raid of convicted terrorist Ramzi Ahmed Yousefs room
revealed sophisticated plans made by Yousef to carry out a series of high profile
attacks in Southeast Asia during 1 995. It does appear that the Abu Sayyaf has
been plugged in to a flourishing Islamic international terrorist network. According
to Philippine military intelligence, the group is now believed to have established
comprehensive links with:
• The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) in Syria;
• Hezbollah in Lebanon;
• Hamas cell in Gaza and the West Bank;
• Gama'a al-lslamiya in Egypt;
• The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria; and
48 u
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Mohammed Jamal Khalifa (Arab businessman who is believed
to have played a key role in helping to coordinate the activities
of Islamic extremists in Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, and the US).49
The internationalization of Southeast Asia's terrorist threat dramatically
increases the probability of the region being affected by conflicts and struggles











The current attention focused on Southeast Asia is in large part due to its
current economic dilemma. The financial crisis that erupted in Asia in mid-1 997
has led to sharp declines in the currencies, stock markets, and other asset prices
of a number of Asian countries. The crisis developed in spite of several decades
of outstanding economic performance in Asia. According to the International
Monetary Fund, u[T]he crisis has put pressure on emerging markets outside the
region; contributed to virulent contagion and volatility in international financial
markets; and is expected to halve the rate of world growth in 1998 from the four
percent rate that was projected pre-crisis to an estimated outcome of about two
percent."
51
Thailand and Indonesia were selected as case studies because of their
long history of dealing with separatist political terrorism, their drastically changed
political landscape, and their current economic instability. From an economic
perspective, Thailand was the first country hit by the financial crisis in Southeast
Asia and Indonesia was the most affected by it. In November 1998, the financial
crisis brought into power the most democratic government in Thailand in more
than two decades. In May 1998, the longest serving leader in Southeast Asia,
51
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Indonesian President Suharto, resigned. His resignation has opened the door for
political and economic reform in Indonesia for the first time since gaining its
independence in 1949.
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Figure 8: Map of Thailand
1. Background
The terrorist threat that currently plagues the southern border of Thailand
can be traced back to insurgency movements led by the CPT in support of the
Malaysian Communist Party during the Emergency. After remaining pockets of
the communist resistance fled to the Thai-Malaysian border, the two
governments worked out agreements to ensure that any communist resurgence
would be contained within the region of Pattani. However, Thai Muslims became
weary of repression by Thai security forces in the region and sought to gain
greater autonomy and freer access to the mostly Muslim nation of Malaysia to
the south. The leading Muslim separatist group in this region after the 1970s
35
was the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO). The main objective of
the PULO was the formation of an independent Muslim state. Because of its
location, PULO enjoyed support from extremist Muslims in both southern
Thailand and northern Malaysia. In the early 1970s, the Thai Government and
the United States spent large amounts of money to counter both the separatists
and communists. However, with the end of its involvement in Vietnam by 1 975,
the United States withdrew its large presence in Thailand as well. From that
point on the Thai Government fought the separatists on its own with a
combination of both police and military forces.
The PULO and various other smaller groups such as the New PULO, the
Barisan Revolusi Nationale (BRN), and the Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani
(GMIP) continue to wage an ongoing Muslim separatist campaign in the southern
part of the country. Extremist groups in the region continue to enjoy a residual
level of popular support, largely because of linguistic and religious alienation from
central Thailand. Moreover, PULO, New PULO, and the GMPI all retain a
sufficient core of loyal followers to carry out a sustained campaign of terrorism. 52
A crackdown on illegal immigration across the Thai-Malaysian border has raised
concern that these terrorist organizations are increasing their recruiting.53
2. Terrorist Activities
These separatist groups carried out a series of bombings and other violent
attacks from August to December 1 997. This surge of terrorist activity took place
52
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following the joint announcement of Operation Falling Leaves by PULO, New
PULO, and the BRN. This was a combined operation aimed at killing
government officials and bureaucrats in the southern Thai provinces of Pattani,
Yala, and Narathiwat. In October, bomb attacks killed seven persons, and a
bombing of a Chinese religious festival in December killed three and wounded
15. Government authorities blamed separatist groups for assassinating eleven
policemen in a two-month period and blowing up a railroad in May.54
3. Government Responses
The Thais have long been suspicious about links between PULO and
Malaysian Muslims, especially in the border province of Kelantan, which is run by
Malaysia's most strongly pro-Muslim opposition party. Thai officials believe that
corrupt or incompetent border guards allow terrorists to flee to Malaysia after
their attacks. Although PULO has little political influence outside the south, its
sporadic bombings have frightened off investors from that part of Thailand. In
fact, the Thai interior minister narrowly escaped death in December 1997, when
a bomb destroyed a bridge he was due to travel over, as part of a tour of the
region only an hour later. Recent activity by PULO seems to be trying to take
advantage of the economic crisis in Thailand that has distracted the
government. 55
Throughout the 1960s and 70s, the Thai government launched military
operations to destroy separatist strongholds and capture its leadership. In the
54
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1970s, the government initiated massive economic projects to construct roads,
schools, colleges, and universities in the Muslim majority provinces. However,
along with police corruption, many Muslims believed that government programs
were a deception to penetrate Pattani culture, economy, and society. 56 As a
result terrorist activity continued on through the 1980s and 90s.
Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai eventually called in the army to take
over the anti-separatist campaign from the Interior Ministry and police. The
police have had a poor reputation in the south, which was seen as the dumping
ground for corrupt or poorly-performing officers from other parts of the country.
To gain Malaysian support in its campaign, the Thai government reminded its
southern neighbor of the help it provided a few years ago when it arrested a
handful of members of the Al Arqam sect (a group then being sought by
Malaysian authorities for extremist activity) in Chiang Mai and handed them over
to the Malaysian government without allowing them any access to lawyers.
Subsequently, Malaysian Prime Minister Mohammed Mahathir authorized the
roundup of PULO members without any public mention within Malaysia for fear of
upsetting local Muslim groups. In mid-January 1998, Malaysian security officials
quietly picked up four known PULO leaders, including Haji Sama-ai Thanam,
head of PULO's military arm, and flew them back to Thailand, where they now
face treason and other criminal charges. What shocked PULO activists was that
these four had actually been arrested not in the border areas but in the capital,
Kuala Lumpur. The PULO is now in disarray. Thai intelligence officers also
56 Syed Serajul Islam, The Islamic Independence Movements in Pattani of Thailand and
Mindanao of the Philippines," Asia Survey vol. XXXVIII, no. 5 (May 1998): 447-448.
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believe that several other PULO leaders have fled from Malaysia to Syria and
Saudi Arabia. Deprived of a safe haven, small groups of PULO members still
inside Thailand have begun giving themselves up to Thai authorities.57
PULO's Operation Falling Leaves demonstrated to the Thai government
that terrorist activity in its southern province was far from latent. The decision to
send the Royal Thai Army in to replace the Thai Border Police/Provincial Police
addressed a major grievance of the population: corruption. Negotiations with the
Malaysian government regarding transnational terrorism may lead to a
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Figure 9: Map of Indonesia
1. Background
Three separatist movements have been waged during the last two
decades in Indonesia with varying degrees of intensity. Organizations in
Northern Sumatra (Aceh Merdeka and the National Liberation Front-Aceh
Sumatra), East Timor (Fretelin/Falintif), and Irian Jaya (the OPM) all continue to
fight for increased autonomy from Jakarta. Perhaps the underlying reason for
this is the fact that under normal circumstances the archipelago would not have
been consolidated like it is had it not been for colonialism. To further inflame the
problem in these regions of discontent, the Indonesian Government implemented
a policy of transmigration in an effort to spread the influence of Javanese power.
40
Terrorist acts conducted by these groups have included kidnappings of
foreigners (i.e. those carried out by the OPM on Irian Jaya in January 1996),
arbitrary assaults against Javanese migrants who had been relocated under
Indonesian Government programs (a wave of attacks occurred in Aceh between
1990 and 1992), and violent intimidation used to disrupt voting (which happened
in East Timor in 1997).58 Each of these areas has its own character and history
that make its separatist movements unique.
Aceh: Aceh is located on the western part of Sumatra and is primarily
Muslim. The Acehnese have a long history of challenging central authority.
Indeed, the Dutch gave up trying to subjugate them from their center of power in
Java. Not long after Indonesian independence in 1949, the Acehnese became
disillusioned with the central government, which they saw as corrupt, indifferent
and un-lslamic. Following the 1953 Darul Islam rebellion, the Acehnese demand
for autonomy was partially recognized by the government's acceptance of it as a
special region in 1959. In 1977, the Aceh Merdeka movement proclaimed
independence for the region. Aceh Merdeka has kept alive the idea of an
independent Islamic state. Opposition to the central government arose again in
1 989. However, this movement, led by the National Liberation Front-Aceh
Sumatra, was put down by immediate and overwhelming government force. The
recent financial crisis in Indonesia has led to a resurgence in calls for an
independent state and the immediate withdrawal of all government troops.
58
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Irian Jaya: Irian Jaya, the former Dutch New Guinea or West New Guinea,
remained under Dutch control after Indonesian independence in 1949. From
1950 to 1962, the Dutch colonial administration instituted policies designed to
prepare the native Papuans for independence and self-governance. However, in
1962 full administrative control was handed over to Indonesia after pressure from
the United Nations and the United States. In 1963, Papuan resistance to the
central government in Java led to the creation of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka
(OPM). This was in response to Indonesia's efforts to exploit the resources and
assimilate the indigenous Papuan and Melanesian populations into the national
administration and culture. The escalation of conflict between the Papuans and
Indonesia during the 1960s led to the Act of Free Choice in 1969, which
mandated the official incorporation of Irian Jaya into the Indonesian state. The
level of resistance diminished in the 1970s after Indonesian armed forces (ABRI
- Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) arrived in large numbers. However,
the OPM continues to operate in remote and inaccessible areas of Irian Jaya.
Indeed, because many of the OPM's leadership remain imprisoned it has been
only marginally been effective at gaining any political advantage.
East Timor. East Timor, the former Portuguese Timor, was incorporated
into the Republic of Indonesia in 1976 as Timor Timur Province, although
Portugal never recognized what it saw as the forcible annexation of its former
territory. The incorporation followed armed Indonesian intervention in December
1 975, which occurred as a reaction to the an unorganized decolonization process
and the declaration of an independent Democratic Republic of East Timor by the
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Frente Revolutionaria Timorense de Libertacao e Independencia {Fretilin) in
November 1975. The heavy toll paid by the East Timorese over the next seven
years was the result of conflict between Fretilin and the ABRI. A cease-fire was
negotiated in 1983, but fighting resumed six months later and continues today,
although on a lesser scale. Indonesia closed East Timor to foreigners from
1975-89 and again in November 1994, after students protested at the US
embassy in Jakarta during a state visit by US President Bill Clinton. The protest
commemorated the 12 November 1991 government massacre of 270 unarmed
civilians at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, East Timor's capitol.
2. Terrorist Activities
Separatist groups in East Timor apparently continued to target non-
combatants and were involved in several bomb-making activities in 1997. In Irian
Java, an attack allegedly conducted by the Organisasi Papua Merdeka against a
road surveying crew in April left two civilians dead.59
Between 1990 and 1992, the National Liberation Front-Aceh Sumatra (a
violent offshoot of Aceh Merdeka) carried out a number of brutal mass attacks
against Javanese civilians who had been resettled in Aceh. The NLF-AS
became infamous for deliberately dismembering their captives while they were
still alive.
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In December 1997, the Indonesian news agency Antara reported that
members of Fretilin killed four members of a local Roman Catholic youth
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association after terrorizing residents of a small village on East Timor. 61 Earlier
that year, an attack on a truck carrying 36 police and soldiers left 17 dead. The
ambush was seen as a signal to the government that separatist violence in East
Timor might expand.
3. Government Responses
In an effort to regain some stability following the financial crisis and the
resignation of Suharto, the interim government has taken some positive steps
towards recognizing the grievances of these troubled provinces. To the
embarrassment of the Suharto regime, Jose Ramos-Horta, the exiled separatist
leader of the Fretilin, was awarded the 1 996 Nobel Peace Prize. Horta has
recently stated that terrorist attacks carried out against civilian collaborators
within the Fretilin underscores the need for peace negotiations. In a step toward
negotiation, Indonesia and Portugal have agreed to the "possibility" of discussing
the situation in East Timor. In June 1998, President Jusuf Habibie said that he
was ready to consider a "special status" for East Timor, but added this would
have to be accepted as a solution by Portugal and the international community. 62
However, Indonesian opposition Amien Rais has stated that the people of East
Timor should be allowed to choose independence.63 Rais made the statement
following a meeting with Fretilin leader Xanana Gusmao who has been in jail
61 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 December 1 997. Original source: Antara News Agency
(Indonesia), 4 December 1997.
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TIMOR.reut/index.html> [21 November 1998].
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since November 1 992. However, the Fretilin leaders in East Timor continue to
attack Indonesian troops despite Indonesian troop withdrawals and diplomatic
negotiations.
Recently, the Indonesian Government has also taken steps to improve the
situation in Irian Jaya by releasing a member of the OPM, Yakob Rumbiak, after
serving only nine years of a 17-year jail term for subversion. Upon his release,
Rumbiak urged the government to give the people of Irian Jaya an opportunity to
form a committee to convey the people's aspirations to the central government. 64
In Aceh, the government has agreed to compensate victims of military
atrocities in the region during the 1990s. According to the National Commission
on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), the ABRI is responsible for the deaths of 781
people, 163 missing, and the torture of another 368.65 The commander of ABRI,
General Wiranto, flew to Aceh in early August 1998 to apologize for abuses
committed by the military and announce the end of military operations in the
province. However, the withdrawal of troops was suspended temporarily when
rioting broke out in cities throughout Aceh.
The interim government of President Habibie has continued to state that it
wants to negotiate peace in these troubled regions of Indonesia. However, the
government still insists that it will control the terms of negotiation. The central
government can ill afford to take many wrong steps. The growing problems in
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Java, the most populated island in Indonesia, have temporarily focused attention
away from addressing reform in its outer provinces. The iron hand of Suharto
and the ABRI can no longer be relied upon to contain the possible spread of
political terrorism and separatist violence.
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V. RESPONDING TO POLITICAL TERRORISM
A. REGIONAL APPROACHES
The economic downturn in Southeast Asia has created concern within the
region that the global market or other regional markets will shy away from
investment in Southeast Asia and jeopardize its recovery. The nations of the
region must set a new course for the future if they wish to regain the benefits of
the past economic fraternity they had developed.66 Although the US presence
remains in Korea, Japan, and throughout Southeast Asia (in combined
exercises), it is no longer a sufficient guarantee of security, nor is it appropriate
for US forces to be involved in addressing such concerns as territorial disputes,
local arms buildups, or ethnic tensions. There are limits and drawbacks to
military response to terrorism. Any military response runs the risk of alienating
the population, legitimizing the terrorists, and provoking backlash against the
government.67 Only discussions among the region's members can address
these concerns effectively.68
Governments reacting to internal instability could cause fears among
neighbors that the countries in question are unable to ensure containment of their
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problems within their borders. The fear of terrorism spreading out from one
country underscores the importance of regional approaches to combating
terrorism, both directly and indirectly. This is a dilemma facing Southeast Asian
countries individually and collectively. The Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) must recognize the dangers of political terrorism and take
steps to ensure that politically weak states have the support of the regional
community. Just as ASEAN is tied together economically, cooperation and
coordination of efforts to contain terrorism must be established to prevent an
"Asian political meltdown."
As Walter Laqueur points out, if the terrorists' demand is all or nothing -
as it often is - concessions based on a compromise will not put an end to
bloodshed. For the most part terrorists are opposed to concessions:
True, political concessions may still to a certain extent dry up the water in
which the terrorist fish swim; if it were a question of popular elections in
order to win over the 'silent majority,' concessions could work. But unlike
political parties, terrorists do not care about parliamentary majorities. A
few hundred extremists based on a relatively small part of the population
stand a good chance of preventing a policy of reconciliation - by their
acts of provocation, assassinating moderate leaders, shouting 'betrayal'
and so on.69
Within a democracy the methods of countering the phenomenon are
rather limited. The government, in the defense of certain values must employ
techniques that will preserve those values. Overreaction, general suppression of
rights, censorship and the use of security forces could all backfire by alienating
the population. Careful and judicious handling of terrorist campaigns are very
difficult tasks, demanding timely and effective actions by the various government
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agencies concerned.70 For whatever reason terrorists conduct their activity, the
government must ensure that their response is what is needed and not what the
terrorists want. However, a government may show inherent weakness by
overreacting or, by not reacting swiftly or forcefully. Those who decide to make
use of soldiers in lieu of police must heavily weigh the costs and benefits of doing
so. In fact, they may in fact be doing exactly what the terrorists want by further
alienating and repressing the population.71
The correct strategy of a democratic regime depends entirely on the
specific challenge it confronts. If it faces an attempt by a small, disaffected
minority to impose its demands on the great majority, political concessions have
to be ruled out. There is no alternative to eliminating those who challenge the
democratic order. If the terrorism is a manifestation of grievances, national or
social, which are at least in part legitimate, the ideal approach is a mixture of
political reforms and counter-terrorist methods, acceding to those demands that
are justified and realistic. In some cases this may lead to an armistice and
eventually to the terrorist desisting from the armed struggle. Elsewhere there is
no alternative but to fight terrorism until it is defeated.72
Whatever Southeast Asian governments attempt, the issue of human
rights will be of particular interest to the United States. The US vision of human










rights of the individual vis-a-vis governments and communities. Asian leaders
argue that Asian cultures reverse these priorities, insisting that benefits for the
collective society must come ahead of the protection of individual interests.73
Moreover, many Asian leaders claim that a basic "human right" must be
economic development, which again downplays individual rights.74
The existence of injustice or inequality within so-called democratic states
provides fertile ground for the development of social movements that view
terrorism as a legitimate tool for change. However, it is not the case that the
elimination of these conditions (to the extent that such is possible) necessarily
would eliminate the threat of terrorism. While such social improvements would
reduce the incidence of terrorism, the increasing evidence of insurgent
philosophies and distinctive motivations among terrorist groups combined with
the disruptive/destructive potential inherent in nuclear, biological, and chemical
material implies that these states will have to face new terrorist policy choices
other than existing remedies for social change.75
Since 1997, ASEAN has taken important steps aimed at promoting
regional and international cooperation to combat transnational crime. ASEAN's
initiatives (see Appendix A and B) define transnational crime as terrorism, drug
trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, and the traffic in persons and
piracy. The first ASEAN Conference on Transnational Crime was held in Manila
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from 18 to 20 December 1997. Although far short from a binding pact on ways to
combat terrorism, this multilateral approach has already led to further meetings to
address this growing concern. It must be kept in mind that ASEAN and the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) were designed primarily to promote stable
relationships between major powers with influence throughout the region (China,
Japan, and the United States). The ARF was only recently formed in 1994, and
still very much in search of a mission. "Real" programs will take years to
develop. ASEAN has made a start, however, the inability of ASEAN to act
undermines its influence and importance.
B. US GOVERNMENT APPROACHES
The United States is certain to sustain important political, security, and
economic positions in the western Pacific. However, it can no longer accomplish
these ends either unilaterally or exclusively through bilateral means. 76 Certainly,
there is a growing number of people in Asia who loudly criticize American political
and economic approaches. This is especially true of former Singapore Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew who made clear his views on the American system:
It is not my business to tell people what's wrong with their system. It is my
business to tell people not to foist their system indiscriminately on societies in
which it will not work.77
The US has an interest in forging a regional approach to counter-
terrorism. Prior to the financial crisis, Lee Kuan Yew's remarks may have played
to a bigger audience outside of Southeast Asia. However, if the financial crisis is




a measuring stick for ASEAN's ability to address and overcome adversity,
Southeast Asia should be very worried about terrorism.
For the United States there is little debate that terrorist attacks on
American citizens and facilities become assaults on our national pride and
national honor. The emotional and psychological impact on the public of such
attacks is understandably great. Action is demanded, and often the president is
left with few options. In this sense, the distinction between threats to national
security and threats to national honor becomes blurred. While the public may not
always be able to "see" a national security threat, it is easy to see the death and
destruction that terrorists inflict upon fellow Americans. 78
The United States is a prime target worldwide for terrorist attacks because
of the heavy attention the media provides. The immediate and extensive
coverage by television, radio, and the press enable terrorists to gain extensive
publicity.
79
While the volume of worldwide terrorism fluctuates from year to year,
one enduring feature is that Americans remain favored targets of terrorists
abroad.80 Since 1968, the United States has annually headed the list of
countries whose nationals and property are most frequently attacked by terrorist














Source: Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997. Available
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Figure 11: Anti-U.S. Attacks, 1997
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Countering the terrorist threat remains a high priority for the United States.
US counter-terrorism approaches are meant to prevent, disrupt, and defeat
terrorist operations before they occur, and if terrorist acts do occur, to respond
overwhelmingly, with determined efforts to bring the perpetrators to justice.82
The Department of State has developed a three-part counter-terrorist policy that
they claim has worked well over the years:
• Make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals.
• Bring terrorists to justice for their crimes.
• Isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor and support
terrorism to force them to change their behavior.83
In October 1997, the US Secretary of State formally designated 30 foreign
terrorist organizations under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, which makes it illegal for US institutions and citizens to provide funds or
other forms of material support to such groups. The law also makes members
and representatives of those terrorist groups ineligible for US visas and subject to
exclusion from the United States. Moreover, US financial institutions are
required to block the funds of those groups and of their agents and to report the
blocking action to the US Department of the Treasury.84 Of the 30 terrorist
82 The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington DC:
Government Printing Office, 1997), 10.
83




organizations listed, only the NPA, the ASG, the ABB, and the Khmer Rouge
were named as terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia.85
The US approach to combating terrorism has evolved over time. David
Tucker suggest that during the last twenty-five years, the United States has
engaged in nine different measures to combat terrorism: international legal
conventions, defensive measures, addressing the causes of terrorism, a policy of
no concessions, economic sanctions, military retaliation, prosecution,
preemption, and disruption.86 It is important to note that these nine measures do
not represent a checklist for combating terrorism. It does, however, demonstrate
the complexity of dealing with terrorism. The cornerstone of all these measures
is the policy of not conceding to terrorist demands. Although there are many
35 On 8 October 1997, the US Secretary of State designated the following groups as terrorist
organizations pursuant to the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The list
also includes other groups that were active in 1997. Listed are the organizations by name,
abbreviation, and primary area of operation: Abu Nidal Organization (ANO, Middle East), Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG, Philippines), Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB, Philippines), Armed Islamic
Group (GIA, Algeria), Aum Supreme Truth (Aum or Aum Shinrikyo, Japan), Basque Fatherland
and Liberty (ETA, Spain), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP, Middle East),
al-Gama'at al-lslamiyya (Islamic Group or IG, Middle East), HAMAS (Islamic Resistance
Movement, Middle East), Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA, Pakistan), Hizballah (Party of God, Middle
East), Irish Republican Army (IRA, Ireland), Jamaat ul-Fuqra (Fuqra, North America and
Pakistan), Japanese Red Army (JRA, Syria), al-Jihad (Egypt), Kach (Kahane Chai, Israel),
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK, Turkey), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, Sri Lanka),
Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF, Ireland), Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR, Chile),
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO, Iraq), National Liberation Army (ELN, Columbia),
New People's Army (NPA, Philippines), Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ, Israel), Palestine Liberation
Front (PLF, Iraq), Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge, Cambodian), Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, Syria), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command (PFLP-GC, Syria), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC, Columbia),
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November, Greece), Revolutionary People's
Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C, Turkey), Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA, Greece),
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path orSL, Peru), Sikh Terrorism (India), and Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA, Peru). "Appendix B," Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997.
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divergent views regarding concessions, the basis for supporting it underlies the
importance of refusing to reward criminal conduct.
Internationally, steps are being taken to address the problem of terrorism.
At the Denver Summit of the Eight held in June 1997, leaders from the United
States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom
made progress in developing joint strategies to counter the terrorist threat:
• The Eight worked with other UN General Assembly members
to complete the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, a new counter-terrorism instrument that was
initiated by the Eight in December 1996. This Convention fills
an important gap in international law by creating a framework
for addressing terrorist bombing attacks anywhere in the
world. (The United States signed the Convention on 12
January 1998.)
• The Eight have launched an international campaign to
promote the universal adoption and ratification of the existing
international terrorism conventions by the year 2000.
• The Eight continue to promote international standards for
airport security, explosive detection, and vehicle identification.
Related experts' meetings, information exchanges, and
multilateral diplomacy have sought to enhance the protection
of public transportation against terrorism.
• Agreement among the Eight to promote stronger domestic
laws and controls over the manufacture, trading, and transport
of explosive will reduce the threat to our citizens from terrorist
attacks.
87
In order to increase international information sharing and law enforcement
efforts, terrorism has been placed at the top of US diplomatic agenda. US
strategic interest in Southeast Asia centers on developing regional and bilateral




resolution, as well as expanding US participation in the region's growth. US
policy combines two approaches: first, maintaining a productive relationship with
ASEAN; and second, pursuing bilateral objectives with individual ASEAN
members. 88
88 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 24.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A. US POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The diverse nature of terrorism and its association with a variety of groups
and state sponsors preclude the design of any single counter-terrorist doctrine or
strategy. Overreactions to terrorist events also encourage potential adversaries
to take advantage of the US preoccupation with such events to further their own
interests in other regions of the world.89 The strategy used in countering
incidents that can be absorbed with minimal or no damage to national security
should be guided by a different set of responses than those to incidents that truly
threaten vital US interests. The first principle should be that our initial response
is relatively low-level, to avoid placing the United States at more risk or diverting
resources needed for other functions.90
The dilemma imposed on the United States is how to design high-level
policies for what are essentially low-level threats. An effective counter-terrorist
policy will require a reorientation in the way terrorism and its effects on this
country are perceived. The following issues will have to be addressed:
• The tendency to equate terrorism with "crisis."
• The roles that both the media and the government play in escalating
the perceived terrorist threat.






• The need to distinguish between those terrorist incidents that may
threaten national security or geopolitical interest and those that do
not.
91
There has been a tendency on the part of both the US media and recent
administrations to categorize all terrorist incidents as crises. This automatically
heightens the public's assessment of the threat. However, it is the reaction to
terrorist incidents that often creates the real crisis. The emphasis placed on
searching for a "solution" to the problem of terrorism may put more critical
security issues, such as regional peace efforts and relations with key allies, at
risk.
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The tendency to view terrorism as "war" has also created problems in
trying to develop an effective counter-terrorist strategy. The vast array of
possible terrorist assaults on American citizens and facilities worldwide obviously
cannot all be considered acts of war, so guidelines must be formulated for
determining whether a particular bombing, kidnapping, or hostage incident
requires a military response. One consideration must be the difficulty of locating
and attacking those responsible for a terrorist incident. Moreover, there is a
strong likelihood that innocent civilians will be killed in the retaliation process.
Further complicating the issue is the high probability that military
preemptive or retaliatory strikes will cause the terrorist to respond with even
greater violence or to attack targets of a higher symbolic level. An escalating






can never be won, given the multitudes of terrorist groups that exist and their
ability to reverse any counter-terrorist progress with one well-placed bomb. 93
A military response, moreover, must be delivered soon after the terrorist
incident that provokes it. A criminal investigation may continue, with arrests
coming years after the event, but military retaliation years after the event has little
political appeal or punitive value.94
As recently as June 1998, a serious blow to US anti-terrorist policy was
handed down. A federal judge ruled that, contrary to the Anti-terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the US Government couldn't prevent
humanitarian activists from helping two groups from other countries designated
as terrorist organizations. US District Judge Audrey B. Collins ruled that the US
State and Justice departments couldn't stop groups from providing personnel and
training to either the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey or the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. But the judge did not overturn the ban on material
aid. She also did not change the law's ban on contributions of weapons,
explosives, lodging, or false identity papers. Collins ruled that certain terms of
the anti-terrorism law were "impermissibly vague." She specifically declared as
unenforceable the section of the law that makes it a crime to provide "personnel"
and "training" to groups designated as terrorist organizations. In the view of
David Cole, a professor at Georgetown University Law Center in Washington,
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right to free speech), it imposes guilt by association rather than on the basis of
one's acts."
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Whatever the outcome of legalistic challenges to anti-terrorism policies,
the United States must continue to provide support for all governments fighting
against terrorism. Indeed, some would advocate an even tougher stance.
According to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) General John
Shalikashvili, the goal should be to replace the United Kingdom and Israel as the
principle anti-terrorism and force protection experts. The General said, "We need
to get to the point, as rapidly as we can, where people ... come to us and say
how the hell do you do that?" He added that the danger of terrorism raises the
potential that it "will become the way of waging war against [the United States]."96
B. SOUTHEAST ASIA'S FUTURE SECURITY
Whether or not the diversity and amount of terrorism will increase in
Southeast Asia, discussion focusing on the nature of terrorism is necessary to
permit international policy makers to move forward beyond the mere exchange of
information and toward international cooperation. Terrorism, however defined,
will not disappear unless a totally oppressive state is in place, and all forms of
expression are subject to censorship. 97 The foremost principle must be the
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objective of the maintenance of democratic processes of government and the
rule of law.
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Perhaps the realistic view is that terrorism cannot be eradicated but
merely contained. In order to construct a functional policy for dealing with
terrorism, there must be, as a first step, a program that views terrorism as
impermissible violence, whatever the motives when directed against any civilian
target. There must also be a program that reduces the power of individual
nations in determining those grounds and defenses that may be interposed
against international terrorism extradition. Most importantly, each nation must
execute a firm, irrevocable commitment to a neutral decision making body that
will determine all the conditions for international extradition of terrorists."
Given the widespread nature of terrorism and its links to different causes
and issues, however, the prospects of significantly reducing the threat through
any single response are questionable. Governments have had some measure of
success in combating the terrorist threat within their own countries, but not
worldwide. 100 Many Western observers agree that realistically the United Nations
is not the best forum for cooperation against terrorism. In fact, from the US point
of view, the inability to agree on condemning terrorism has discredited the United
Nations. In general, the larger number of actors involved, the more difficult it is to
achieve cooperation in any area. This may already be, or may become, the








the controversial nature of terrorism, it is not surprising that international treaties
are often ineffective because of less than enthusiastic support and reluctant
implementation.
A set of principles is necessary for an effective guide to anti-terrorist
policy. Formation of policy should be based on an analysis of successful tactics
used in the past, together with basic assumptions about the sorts of actions
acceptable to a democratic society, and also allowing change. Broad policy
guidelines should be capable of assisting decision making on a wide range of
diverse policy issues. The following list contains some examples of actions that
might be suggested as part of a unilateral anti-terrorist campaign:
• Attempt to find long-term solutions to the underlying causes of
terrorism.
• Increase the size and powers of the security forces (for example,
increase manpower, search and entry powers, power to detain
without trial, etc.). This would involve major policy decisions about
the nature of policing our society, civil rights, etc.
• Introduce capital punishment for terrorist activities.
• Enact legislation limiting rights of assembly and increasing controls
over the members of society by way of identification cards,
registration of residence and extensive use of computerized files.
• Establish a "third force" or special military units to cope with terrorist
attacks.
• Announce a policy of "no negotiations" with terrorists.
• Increase physical and procedural security.
• Introduce internment without trial or special legal procedures
designed to limit intimidation of witnesses.






Introduce special anti-terrorist legislation, which may mandate a
combination of the above or other measures.
Make it illegal for individuals or private organizations to pay ransom
to terrorists or to take out ransom insurance and place a legal duty
on people to report hostage taking to the police.
Promote and become a signatory to international treaties providing
for extradition or trial of captured terrorist, suspension of air
services to countries providing safe haven for hijackers, etc.
Research and develop alternatives to hostage negotiations.
Suggest that terrorist groups be encouraged to adhere to the norms
articulated by the customary laws of war, the Geneva Conventions,
and the Nuremberg Principles.
Develop and deploy highly intrusive technologies as preemptive
moves.
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The perceived inadequacy of the United Nations has caused Western
states to seek the establishment of a separate model for cooperation at regional
levels.
102
In order to develop a framework for cooperation, ASEAN might




The rules of cooperative behavior must be defined.
2. The mutual benefits of cooperation must be clear.
3. The distinction between cooperation and non-cooperation must
be apparent.








In its pursuit of cooperation against terrorism, ASEAN's regional
cooperation should not be based on the insistence that all policies that benefit
the United States necessarily benefit all its member states. Nations differ in their
vulnerabilities and response capabilities. The United States cannot simply ask
others to endorse American national policies. Cooperation has to be negotiated,
not imposed. The purpose of cooperation is to improve international security by
building on national strengths, not to produce uniform policies. 104
ASEAN must remind the United States that if it is to maintain its lead in
promoting cooperation against terrorism, its national policy must not succumb to
short-term interests or domestic pressures. At the same time, American
policymakers must be sensitive to the domestic concerns of other states. 105
Additionally, Asian decisions to create their own security mechanisms are part of
the growing realization that America's post-Cold War foreign policy goals may not
be entirely compatible with Asian political developments. The Clinton
administration has placed democracy and human rights near the top of its global
agenda. This means that Washington has become increasingly concerned with
how Asian states are governed. From ASEAN's viewpoint, this comes perilously
close to direct interference in its internal politics and a challenge to its governing
structures.
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A practical approach to isolating terrorism should focus on its
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point should be made and repeated that no cause is well served by terrorism,
which can only fail as a means of bringing about long-term political change.
Terrorism is most often damaging to the hopes of those who use it, not only
because it provokes government repression but also because terrorism unites
the public against it and in support of a hard-line response. Terrorism should be
discredited as a method, but it is pointless to deny that ambiguities exist in
defining it and distinguishing it from other forms of violence. 107
In some instances terrorism may not outgrow the nuisance stage, in which
case no further drastic action will be necessary. There is an inclination to
magnify the importance of terrorism in modern society: society is vulnerable to
attack, but it is also quite resilient. Oil executives are abducted, but not a single
drop of oil is lost. Terrorism makes a tremendous noise, but compared to some
other dangers facing mankind, it seems almost irrelevant. 108 The danger of
international terrorism, in other words, is not in terrorist acts per se, but in
triggering off a wider and more dangerous armed conflict. For this reason, it is
important to prevent escalation, to resist state-sponsored terrorism from the
beginning, and not to lead its sponsors into temptation. 109
When terrorism is allowed to get so far that only military forces can handle







unless the military nature of what the terrorists are doing is taken seriously, and
studied from the outset, things generally do get out of hand. 110
Ultimately, terrorism can be defeated only if it can be seen as unprofitable,
both in the long and short term. This is primarily a task for regional police
enforcement, determined government policies, a cooperative public, and the
media. Meanwhile, until terrorism is contained, the public must be protected
against it, in such a way that the reaction does not do more damage than the
terrorist act itself.
111 As we enter the new millennium, Southeast Asia's future is
far from certain. However, the danger presented by political terrorism within
some of the countries hardest hit by the current crisis demands that the United
States, ASEAN, and individual nations take proactive steps toward cooperative
anti-terrorist policies.
The case studies of Thailand and Indonesia demonstrate the necessity of
a strong unilateral approach toward counter-terrorism. However, the weakness
of such an approach is highlighted by its failure to extinguish the existence of
terrorism, especially political terrorism carried out by separatist organizations.
ASEAN member nations must individually and collectively develop workable
bilateral and multilateral conventions designed to isolate terrorist organizations
from outside support. By doing this, ASEAN and its members can increase
political stability within the region.
110
Francis M. Watson, Political Terrorism: The Threat and the Response (New York: Luce, 1976),
189-190.
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Richard Clutterbuck, Guerrillas and Terrorists (London: Farber, 1977), 95.
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It is therefore recommended that US policy towards terrorism need not
change to accommodate Southeast Asia and that ASEAN and its individual
states take greater steps toward containing the spread of terrorism in the region




ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime
WE, the ASEAN Ministers of Interior/Home Affairs and Representatives of
ASEAN Member Countries, participating in the first ASEAN Conference on
Transnational Crime held in Manila on 18-20 December 1997;
CONCERNED about the pernicious effects of transnational crime, such as
terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, traffic in
persons and piracy on regional stability and development, the maintenance of the
rule of law and the welfare of the region's peoples;
RECOGNIZING the need for clear and effective regional modalities to combat
these forms of crimes, especially on the aspect of information exchange and
policy coordination;
RECALLING the Naples Political Declaration and Global Plan of Action of 23
November 1994, which sought international solidarity and effective legal
cooperation against these forms of crime;
RECALLING FURTHER the Baguio Communique adopted during the first
International Conference on Terrorism held in Baguio City, Philippines, on 18-21
February 1996, which endeavored to enhance international cooperation against
all forms of terrorism through such modalities as intelligence-sharing, coordinated
policies and law enforcement training;
NOTING the decision of the 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Jakarta in
July 1996 on the need to focus attention on such issues as narcotics, economic
crimes, including money laundering, environment and illegal migration which
transcend borders and affect the lives of the people in the region, and the urgent
need to manage such transnational issues so that they would not affect the long
term viability of ASEAN and its individual member nations;
ENDEAVOURING to further the decision of the First Informal ASEAN Summit in
November 1996 in Jakarta to request the relevant ASEAN bodies to study the
possibility of regional cooperation on criminal matters, including extradition;
PURSUANT to the decision of the 30th AMM in Kuala Lumpur in July 1997 which
stressed the need for sustained cooperation in addressing transnational
concerns including the fight against terrorism, trafficking in people, illicit drugs
and arms and piracy;
AFFIRMING the agreement among Heads of Government during the Second
Informal Summit in December 1997 in Kuala Lumpur to take firm and stern
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measures to combat transnational crime such as drug trafficking and trafficking of
women and children, as well as other transnational crime; and,
CONVINCED that the continuity of existing global framework against
transnational crime rests on consolidated regional action in the institutional and
operational spheres:
HAVE RESOLVED TO CONFRONT THE PROBLEM OF TRANSNATIONAL
CRIME THROUGH THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:
1
.
Strengthen the commitment of Member Countries to cooperate at the
regional level in combating the transnational crime;
2. Convene at least once every two years ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on
Transnational Crime in order to coordinate activities of relevant ASEAN
bodies, such as the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD) and
the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police (ASEANAPOL);
3. Hold discussions with a view to signing mutual legal assistance
agreements, bilateral treaties, memorandum of understanding or other
arrangements among Member Countries;
4. Consider the establishment of an ASEAN Center on Transnational Crime
(ACOT) which will coordinate regional efforts against transnational crime
through intelligence sharing, harmonization of policies and coordination of
operations;
5. Convene a high-level ad-hoc Experts Group within one year to
accomplish the following with the assistance of the ASEAN Secretariat:
a. a. ASEAN Plan of Action on Transnational Crime,
b. Institutional Framework for ASEAN Cooperation on Transnational
Crime, and,
c. Feasibility study on the establishment of ACOT;
6. Encourage Member Countries to consider assigning Police Attaches
and/or Police Liaison Officers in each other's capital in order to facilitate
cooperation for tackling transnational crime;
7. Encourage networking of the relevant national agencies or organizations
in Member Countries dealing with transnational crime to further enhance
information exchange and dissemination;
8. Expand the scope of Member Countries' efforts against transnational
crime such as terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money
laundering, traffic in persons and piracy, and to request the ASEAN
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Secretary-General to include these areas in the work program of the
ASEAN Secretariat;
9. Explore ways by which the Member Countries can work closer with
relevant agencies and organizations in Dialogue Partner countries, other
countries and international organizations, including the United Nations and
its specialized agencies, Colombo Plan Bureau, Interpol and such other
agencies, to combat transnational crime;
10. Cooperate and coordinate more closely with other ASEAN bodies such
as the ASEAN Law Ministers and Attorneys-General, the ASEAN Chiefs of
National Police, the ASEAN Finance Ministers, the Directors-General of
Immigration and the Directors-General of Customs in the investigations,
prosecution and rehabilitation of perpetrators of such crimes; and,
1 1
.
Strengthen the ASEAN Secretariat's capacity to assist the Member
Countries in initiating, planning, and coordinating activities, strategies,
programs and projects to combat transnational crime.
SIGNED this 20th day of December 1997 in Manila, Philippines.
Dato Paduka Haji Abidin bin Orang Kaya Periwara Abd. Rashid
Acting Minister of Home Affairs
Brunei Darussalam
Yogie S. Memet




Lao People's Democratic Republic
Dato Mohammad Tajol Rosli Ghazali
Deputy Minister of Home Affairs
Malaysia
Tin Hlaing
Minister of Home Affairs
Union of Myanmar
Robert Z. Barbers
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government
Republic of the Philippines
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Simon Tensing de Cruz
Ambassador
Embassy of the Republic of Singapore in the Philippines
Xujati Boonto
Charge d'Affaires
Embassy of the Kingdom of Thailand in the Philippines
Le Minh Huong
Minister of Interior
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam




ON THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
INTRODUCTION
1. The General Assembly, in its resolution 49/159, approved the Naples Political
Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime
(A/49/748, annex) adopted by the World Ministerial Conference on Organized
Transnational Crime, held at Naples, Italy, from 21 to 23 November 1994, and
urged States to implement them as a matter of urgency. The General Assembly,
in its resolution 51/120, requested the Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice to consider, as a matter of priority, the question of the
elaboration of an international convention against transnational crime. On the
recommendation of the Commission, and the Economic and Social Council, the
General Assembly in its resolution 52/85, decided to establish an inter-sessional
open-ended intergovernmental working group of experts for the purpose of
elaborating a preliminary draft of a possible comprehensive international
convention against organized transnational crime, which would submit a report
thereon to the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice at its
seventh session. Pursuant to that resolution and thanks to the generosity of the
Government of Poland, the meeting was held on 2-6 February 1998 in Warsaw
(Poland).
2. On the recommendation of the Commission, contained in draft resolution I
adopted at its fifth session, the General Assembly adopted, by its resolution
51/59, the International Code of Conduct for Public Officials. By its resolution
51/191 of 16 December 1996, the Assembly also adopted the United Nations
Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial
Transactions.
3. Pursuant to the above-mentioned resolutions, the Asian Regional Ministerial
Meeting on Transnational Crime was held at Manila from 23 to 25 March 1998 on
the invitation of the Government of the Philippines.
I. RECOMMENDATIONS
4. The Regional Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime unanimously




ON THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
We, Ministers and Representatives of the States participating in the Asia
Regional Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, held at Manila, Philippines,
from 23 to 25 March 1998, organized by the United Nations Center for
International Crime Prevention, with the Government of the Philippines acting as
the Host;
Assembled for the purpose of promoting regional and international cooperation to
combat transnational crime and to devise modalities to improve the capacity of
our countries to respond more effectively to the threats we are facing;
Reiterating the importance of implementing the principles contained in the Naples
Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational
Crime, as well as other pertinent United Nations instruments;
Convinced of the need for effective national and regional action against
transnational crime, particularly in view of its serious debilitating effects on
democratic institutions, the maintenance of the rule of law and the development
process;
Mindful of the crucial importance of action against transnational crime, including
organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, trafficking in human beings and
various forms of financial crimes and corruption, and the need for appropriate
legislation and regulatory measures, as well as of an efficient and fair criminal
justice system;
Conscious of the important role played by the United Nations in fostering
international cooperation and developing practical strategies to prevent and
combat transnational crime in all its forms and dimensions;
Bearing in mind the Shizuoka Declaration of the Sixth Asia Crime Prevention
Foundation Conference on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, held in Tokyo
and Shizuoka, Japan, from 28 October to I November 1997;
Bearing in mind also the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime of 20
December 1997 which called for the expansion of the scope of the efforts of-
member countries to combat transnational crime such as terrorism, drug
trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, traffic in persons and piracy, and
the exploration of ways by which the member countries can work closer with






We recognize that organized transnational crime undermines civil society,
distorts legitimate markets and destabilizes States. Criminal groups are creative
in their endeavors in establishing alliances in the region and in other parts of the
globe by taking advantage of gaps and weaknesses in international cooperation
in criminal matters.
2. We are concerned about the increase and expansion of organized criminal
activities, such as trafficking in human beings, transnational exploitation of
women and children, drug trafficking, trafficking in firearms and motor vehicles,
illegal trade in cultural objects and natural resources including flora and fauna,
money laundering and other forms of financial crimes and corruption. We
express our determination and political will to take concrete action by, among
other measures:
(a) promoting national and regional action against transnational crime and
corruption;
(b) developing effective strategies aimed at defeating the economic power of
criminal organizations, dismantling their alliances and support networks and
developing effective mechanisms capable of bringing members and leaders
of criminal groups to justice;
(c) improving the functioning of our institutions, in particular the criminal
justice systems, reviewing, modernizing and harmonizing, as appropriate,
existing laws and regulations to ensure their continued relevance, efficiency
and adaptability to modem manifestations of organized crime;
(d) enacting new laws and regulations, responding to the complexity and
sophistication of various forms of transnational crime, so as to bridge the
gaps in legal systems which can be exploited by organized criminal groups;
(e) strengthening the capacity of our law enforcement agencies and criminal
justice personnel, and upgrading their skills through specialized training in the
area of transnational crime, money laundering and other economic offenses,
including corruption, and the elaboration of the required training materials;
(f) implementing existing and developing new regional programs aiming at the
implementation of the various recommendations of the Naples Political
Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime,
(g) intensifying cooperation and coordination at the national level among
relevant agencies to deal with various forms of transnational crime; and
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(h) fostering close collaborative ties with international organizations, in
particular Interpol and relevant non-governmental organizations.
3. We also recognize that the Asia and Pacific region is witnessing rapid
economic and political changes, together with advancements in communications
and technology. These developments not only stimulate closer contacts with
global markets, but also facilitate linkages between criminal organizations and
allow joint criminal ventures. We note that the use and exploitation of computers
and telecommunications technology for criminal activities have increased.
4. We call upon States that are not yet parties to the United Nations Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1 988 to
ratify or adhere to it without delay and to implement it fully.
5. We realize that organized crime, drug trafficking, corruption and other
economic crime generate large profits, which are used in illegal activities and to
infiltrate legitimate businesses and financial enterprises, affecting negatively the
development processes of our countries. It is therefore imperative that we
prevent and control money laundering by, inter alia :
(a) developing modem and adequate investigation and information-gathering
techniques to prevent criminals from manipulating and using the financial
systems to disguise the origin of assets and funds, and developing complex
structures that make detection unlikely and the collection of evidence difficult;
and complementing this approach by actively encouraging and securing the
cooperation of financial institutions and the business community through
appropriate regulations and mechanisms;
(b) when appropriate, revising existing laws and regulations and enacting new
laws, in order to integrate therein provisions on money laundering, in
particular, those dealing with the extension of anti-money laundering
measures to cover all serious offenses and the reporting of suspicious
transactions to appropriate authorities, combined with effective
implementation mechanisms to ensure prevention and control of the
laundering of the proceeds of crime; and
(c) supporting the Global Program Against Money Laundering, developed by
the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) and the
Center for International Crime Prevention, with a view to having cooperation
activities with these entities to address the needs of the region in this field by
paying particular attention to institution building and training of personnel.
6. We reiterate the view that corruption in various forms, including corruption and
bribery in international commercial transactions, and their linkages with the
various forms of organized crime undermine the values of democracy and
morality and jeopardize the social, economic and political development of the
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countries of our region. Therefore, we confirm our commitment to combat all
corrupt practices by, among other measures:
(a) developing prevention and control measures to promote a culture of
accountability and transparency, with the active involvement and support of
the public;
(b) developing comprehensive anti-corruption programs, including
administrative, civil, procedural and criminal legislation, as well as regulatory
provisions and administrative action;
(c) putting into effect, as appropriate, the various provisions of the
International Code of Conduct for Public Officials, adopted by the General
Assembly in its resolution 51/59, the United Nations Declaration on Public
Security, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 51/60, and the
United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International
Commercial Transactions, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution
51/191 as well as the recommendations of the Expert Group Meeting on
Corruption, held in Buenos Aires, 17-21 March 1997, in order to strengthen
national institutions and call attention, at national and international levels, to
the need for addressing the problems of corruption and bribery.
7. We note that the phenomena of corruption and bribery have become
transnational in nature. Consequently, we encourage the Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice, in accordance with its existing mandate, to
examine the feasibility of a global convention against corruption and bribery,
taking into consideration successful initiatives in this field, such as the 1996 Inter-
American Convention against Corruption, adopted by members of the
Organization of American States, and the Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, adopted in 1997
by the OECD members and a number of non-OECD members.
8. We are convinced that combating the above-mentioned forms of crime
requires concerted action at all levels. As these crimes transcend national
boundaries, international cooperation is essential, complemented by
collaborative ties at the regional and sub-regional levels. To that end, we are
determined that our efforts should be focused on the following actions:
(a) creating the necessary infrastructures for regional and sub-regional
cooperation of criminal justice institutions and law enforcement agencies to
detect, investigate and effectively prosecute various forms of transnational
crime with special emphasis on organized crime and corruption, taking full
advantage of the experience of existing bilateral and regional arrangements;
(b) intensifying the exchange of information and experience regarding the
occurrence and patterns of organized crime and corruption, benefiting from
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best practices applied in different countries, and taking into account
developments in the region.
9. We recognize the urgent need to make progress in Vigorously promoting
international cooperation in criminal matters. In this regard, we urge that special
attention be given to extradition, mutual assistance, witness protection, transfer
of prisoners, seizure and forfeiture of the proceeds of crime, as well as to other
forms of regional and international cooperation in criminal matters. Towards that
end we encourage focus on the following cooperation modalities, bearing in mind
the differences in our legal systems:
(a) reviewing and updating our extradition and mutual assistance
arrangements or agreements, or concluding such arrangements, as
appropriate, so as to facilitate the application of extradition, mutual assistance
and witness protection laws and practices among the countries of the region;
(b) in concluding bilateral or regional agreements, efforts should be made to
include provisions on simplified extradition procedures, taking into account
the need for each country to have its own extradition law and to respect
safeguards contained in that law;
(c) establishing national central authorities to process requests for extradition
and mutual assistance and putting in place mechanisms that would ensure
coordination between competent national authorities; and
(d) making full use of the United Nations Model Treaties on International
Cooperation in Criminal Matters when concluding bilateral, subregional or
regional agreements or arrangements in this field, and taking full advantage
of the expertise of the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice regarding modalities of cooperation in criminal matters.
10. We welcome the results achieved by the inter-sessional open-ended
intergovernmental group of experts on the elaboration of a draft international
convention against organized transnational crime, which met in Warsaw, Poland,
from 2 to 6 February 1998. We believe that the outline of options for contents of
the convention serves as a solid basis for its further elaboration. We strongly
support such an endeavor and confirm our commitment to play an active role in
the efforts to resolve differences and overcome conceptual or substantive
difficulties so that the process can move with speed towards its conclusion. We
urge the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to take
advantage of the existing momentum and the consensus achieved on the
desirability of such a convention, with a view to speeding up the process of its
drafting and finalizing such a project as soon as possible.
1 1
.
We are convinced that, in order to achieve progress in combating the various
forms of crime mentioned above, the capacities of our crime prevention and
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criminal justice infrastructures should be strengthened. Technical assistance and
advisory services provided by regional and international organizations are
essential for many of the countries 'm our region, particularly those which are
undergoing economic hardships and do not possess the means to institute
effectively appropriate reforms and changes.
12. We believe that technical assistance should respond to the specific needs of
the countries of the region and take account of the following issues:
(a) strengthening national capacities, including the creation of specialized
structures capable of dealing with the complexity of organized crime;
(b) establishing arrangements for the systematic collection, collation and
analysis of data on structures, functions and manifestations of organized
transnational crime, including trafficking in human beings, money laundering
and corruption, and using such data in the development and implementation
of appropriate policies should be pursued;
(c) exchanging information regarding legislative measures in order to assist in
enactment of new legislation in response to newly emerging patterns of crime;
(d) organizing training courses and seminars for law enforcement and criminal
justice personnel and developing training materials such as manuals and
training curricula, with a view to upgrading their skills, promoting the
exchange of experiences and know-how;
(e) developing and implementing bilateral, subregional, regional and
international treaties on cooperation in criminal justice matters, drawing on
the expertise of regional States and the United Nations; and
(f) ensuring that the sectors of society that may be involved in transnational
crime by reason of poverty and similar circumstances be provided with
effective and sustainable alternative sources of livelihood and/or provided
with opportunities to put their talents to legitimate use.
13. We recognize the important role played by the United Nations Center for
International Crime Prevention in providing technical assistance and advisory
services. Its role in facilitating the creation of joint initiatives and the formulation
and implementation of technical cooperation projects, involving not only the
interested developing countries but also other interested countries and relevant
agencies, should be enhanced, with a view to maintaining efficient criminal
justice systems as an essential element of development efforts. The resources
for the Center should be strengthened in order for it to cope with the increased
demand for technical assistance and advisory services.
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14. We also recognize the important role played by institutions and organizations
in the Asia and Pacific region, such as the United Nations Asia and Far East
Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI)
and the Asia Crime Prevention Foundation (ACPF) in assisting the countries of
the region in this field.
15. We recognize as well the important role of subregional organizations in
pursuing initiatives focused on their geographic areas and in establishing inter-
organizational coordination mechanisms to address the problem of transnational
crime.
16. We are convinced of the fact that building up the capacity of governments to
effectively cooperate with each other in criminal justice matters, particularly in
relation to combating organized crime and corruption, is a joint responsibility of
developed and developing countries and relevant agencies. We therefore call
upon countries, the United Nations Development Program, the World Bank, the
Asian Development Bank, and other relevant international, regional and national
agencies to give favorable consideration to technical assistance project
proposals submitted to them by the Center for International Crime Prevention on
strengthening our national or regional capacities and creating the expertise
required for the prevention and control of organized transnational crime and
corruption. In this connection, and given the high priority attached by our
Governments to these matters, we appeal to prospective donors to give
favorable consideration to the further development and implementation of action
plans contained in the project proposals, including the integration of the activities
foreseen in such proposals in the national' development plans of our countries
and in the respective country programs of UNDP.
17. We express our determination to ensure proper follow-up to the
pronouncements of this Declaration by undertaking the following:
(a) encouraging our Governments to take the necessary measures, in
accordance with their countries, respective legal systems, to implement the
various provisions of the Declaration; and
(b) appealing to Governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations and relevant institutes, to assist the efforts of the countries of
the region in their fight against transnational crime.
Available [Online]: <http://www.asean.or.id/politics/mancnm98.htm> [24 November 1998].
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